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The binary (one-bit-per-photon) encoding that most existing quantum key distribution (QKD)
protocols employ puts a fundamental limit on their achievable key rates, especially under high chan-
nel loss conditions associated with long-distance fiber-optic or satellite-to-ground links. Inspired
by the pulse-position-modulation (PPM) approach to photon-starved classical communications, we
design and demonstrate the first PPM-QKD, whose security against collective attacks is established
through continuous-variable entanglement measurements that also enable a novel decoy-state proto-
col performed conveniently in post processing. We achieve a throughput of 8.0 Mbit/s (2.5 Mbit/s
for loss equivalent to 25 km of fiber) and secret-key capacity up to 4.0 bits per detected photon, thus
demonstrating the significant enhancement afforded by high-dimensional encoding. These results
point to a new avenue for realizing high-throughput satellite-based or long-haul fiber-optic quantum
communications beyond their photon-reception-rate limits.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.-a
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] allows two re-
mote users, Alice and Bob, to create a shared random
key while precluding an eavesdropper (Eve) from obtain-
ing any meaningful amount of information. To date, nu-
merous QKD protocols have demonstrated robust extrac-
tion of secret keys over 200 km of fiber, and satellite-to-
ground links, with secret-key rates up to the order of 10
bit/s [3–11]. These protocols, namely decoy-BB84 [3, 4],
coherent one-way (COW) [5, 6], differential phase-shift
(DPS) [7, 8], and entanglement-based QKD [9, 10], share
a common binary (qubit) encoding, with photon informa-
tion efficiency (PIE) of at most 1 bit per detected photon.
Their secret-key rates are severely limited by the photon
flux at the receiver, typically on the order of Hz for long-
distance transmission [11]. QKD usually operates under
photon-starved conditions in which the receiver’s photon
detection rate is dramatically lower than the transmit-
ter’s photon generation rate owing to propagation loss
and less-than-unity efficiencies in single-photon detectors
[12].
For classical optical communications in high loss sce-
narios, a solution to photon-starved reception is to uti-
lize pulse-position modulation (PPM) [13], a form of sig-
nal modulation in which k message bits are encoded
by transmitting a single pulse in one of N = 2k possi-
ble time bins. PPM is particularly useful in free-space
satellite communication links including the recent lu-
nar laser-communication demonstration [14], achieving
high data rates with an excellent average-power effi-
ciency. A quantum version of PPM could enable photon-
efficient satellite-based or long-distance QKD with multi-
ple bits encoded in a single photon, leading to secret-key
rates much beyond the photon reception limit. Never-
theless, its demonstration remains elusive as it requires
pulse-position modulation/demodulation performed at
the single-photon level. Moreover, the nature of high-
dimensional encoding [2, 15, 16, 18, 19] of PPM-QKD
precludes the use of conventional security proofs for qubit
protocols [20–23]. A new PPM-compatible protocol with
tailored error-correction and finite-key analysis is needed
to reap its potential advantages.
Here we demonstrate a hybrid QKD architecture
that uses weak amplified spontaneous emission (ASE)
pulses for PPM prepare-and-measure key generation,
and a continuous-variable entanglement probe to estab-
lish security via near-unity-visibility Franson interfer-
ometry [24, 25]. We combine the analysis of decoy-
state protocols [23] in discrete-variable QKD, which esti-
mates the fraction of single-photon detections, with the
security proof against collective attacks in continuous-
variable QKD [1, 26] to bound Eve’s Holevo information.
Our proof-of-principle PPM-QKD experiment realized a
high PIE up to 4.0 secret bits per detected photon and
achieved a maximum throughput of 2.5 (8.0) Mbit/s at a
propagation loss equivalent to that of 25 (≈ 0) km fiber
distance. This high rate was obtained with considerably
fewer detected photons than what would be required for
a comparable rate with the state-of-the-art decoy-state
BB84 protocol. Similar to PPM usage in classical com-
munications, we also show enhancements of PPM-QKD
throughput beyond the photon reception limit at increas-
ing channel losses, thus demonstrating a useful technique
for high-rate satellite-based QKD or long-haul fiber-optic
quantum networks.
The basic PPM-QKD scheme is illustrated in Fig. 1(a),
with the experimental setup shown in Fig. 1(b). PPM
key bits are encoded by modulating weak ASE light in
time frames of duration Tf each comprisingN τ -duration
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FIG. 1. (color online). Schematic of PPM-QKD: (a) time
segment of several time frames Tf with ASE and SPDC sig-
nal photons; (b) experimental setup with a 50:50 fiber beam
splitter used by Bob for key generation and Franson measure-
ments. See text for additional details. PBS: polarizing beam
splitter, TDC: time-to-digital converter, SPAD: single-photon
avalanche diode, att: attenuator.
time bins. We randomly insert additional Tf -duration
frames, containing time-energy entangled photons gener-
ated from continuous-wave (cw) spontaneous paramet-
ric downconversion (SPDC), into the stream of PPM
frames. These SPDC frames serve two critical func-
tions. First, they allow the recent security proof for
high-dimensional temporal encoding via Franson inter-
ferometry [2] to be applied to PPM-QKD. Second, they
provide a decoy state—by using different mean photon
numbers for the ASE and SPDC light—from which the
single-photon component in the ASE PPM can be deter-
mined. Filtering is used to match the spectra of the ASE
and SPDC light so that they present indistinguishable
thermal-state statistics to Eve.
For each time frame, Alice randomly chooses between
sending ASE or SPDC light to Bob through an optical
fiber that is subject to Eve’s attack. Alice and Bob share
a publicly-synchronized clock to align their time bins and
N -bin time frames. Bob randomly measures the pho-
ton arrival time either directly, for extracting symbols of
k = log2N bits, or after his arm of the Franson interfer-
ometer. Whenever Alice transmits SPDC signal light she
measures her retained idler beam through her arm of the
Franson interferometer to establish security. After many
uses of the quantum channel, Alice publicly announces
her choice of the sources used for each frame. For ASE
frames, Bob first sifts the raw symbols from those frames,
then proceeds to error correction and privacy amplifica-
tion.
In Alice’s random selection of PPM (for key genera-
tion) or SPDC (for Franson interference) light to send to
Bob, we employ an asymmetric selection ratio, favoring
PPM, in order to achieve a higher key generation rate
than that obtainable with a 50:50 ratio. Eve’s inabil-
ity to distinguish which source Alice has used allows her
accessible information to be bounded by visibility mea-
surement from a single Franson interferometer. The PIE
(bits per photon) is given by [1, 26]
∆INAB = βI
N
AB − χE, (1)
where β is the reconciliation efficiency, INAB is Alice and
Bob’s Shannon information (SI) for a frame size N , and
χE is Eve’s Holevo information for a collective Gaussian
attack considering finite key lengths [26]. Our finite-key
analysis follows [3] and its details are given in the Sup-
plemental Material [29]. To bound Eve’s Holevo infor-
mation, Alice and Bob monitor the Franson interference
visibility V , which is linked to the two-photon frequency
anti-correlation by V = 〈cos[(ωˆA−ωˆB)∆T ]〉, where ∆T is
the propagation delay between the interferometer’s long
and short paths, and ωˆA(ωˆB) is the frequency operator
measuring the zero-mean detuning of Alice’s (Bob’s) pho-
ton at the frequency ωp/2+ ωA (ωp/2− ωB). Here ωp is
the center frequency of the SPDC pump laser. Measur-
ing the degradation of the visibility from its theoretical
value V th yields an upper bound on χE (see Supplemen-
tal Material [29] or [16] for details).
The overall secret-key rate (bit/s) is given by [6]
R = Rf [Q1(nR − χE1 )−Qµ(nR − βINAB)], (2)
where Rf is the frame rate per second, nR is the number
of random bits shared between Alice and Bob after er-
ror correction, Qµ is the overall gain (the probability for
Bob to obtain a detection event in a frame), Q1 and χE1
are, respectively, the lower bound on the single-photon
gain and the upper bound of Eve’s Holevo information
for frames in which Alice sends a single-photon state and
Bob obtains a detection. Qµ can be measured directly
from experiment, while Q1 and χE1 can be estimated from
our novel decoy-state method that can be performed in
post processing (See Supplemental Material [29] for de-
tails).
In our proof-of-principle experiment shown schemati-
cally in Fig. 1(b), the ASE light from an erbium-doped
fiber amplifier was intensity modulated for PPM with
random symbols from a 10 Gbit/s pattern generator.
The duration of each PPM pulse was ≈100 ps, match-
ing the detector gate width (see below). The ASE light
was then attenuated to an average of µPPM photons in
the occupied bin. For security, a type-II phase-matched
single-spatial-mode periodically poled KTiOPO4 waveg-
uide generated a stream of high quality time-energy en-
tangled photon pairs at 1560 nm via SPDC [31], and was
operated with a mean photon pair µSPDC per bin. The
orthogonally polarized signal and idler pairs were sepa-
rated by a polarizing beam splitter with the idler photons
directed to Alice’s arm of the Franson interferometer.
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FIG. 2. (color online). (a) Measured Franson visibilities as a function of frame size N . Inset shows time-bin resolved Franson
visibilities for N = 10. Near-unity visibilities are observed in all bins except the first one. (b) Optimized PIE with different
frame sizes. Green bars are PIE after error correction and privacy amplification. Error bars are due to uncertainties in the
Franson visibilities. (c) Short-distance PPM-QKD throughput and photon reception rate as functions of frame size.
Alice used an optical switch to route the ASE or SPDC
signal light through a dense wavelength-division multi-
plexer (DWDM) filter to Bob. The DWDM filter had a
Gaussian spectral shape with a 200 GHz (1.6 nm) band-
width full-width at half-maximum, which matches that
of the SPDC spectrum [31]. The ASE and SPDC sig-
nal light were thus spectrally identical after DWDM fil-
tering. The optical switch was driven at a frame rate
of 1.26/N GHz and the time bin duration τ was 794
ps. We set a 7:3 ratio between PPM frames (with ASE
light sent) and Franson frames (with SPDC signal light
sent). A higher ratio would favor higher QKD through-
put, but also require longer integration times for Fran-
son measurements. The protocol requires one or more
true quantum random-number generators (QRNGs). Al-
though only pseudo-random numbers were used, we note
that QRNGs operating at Gbit/s have been developed
[32].
Bob used a 50:50 beam splitter to passively choose be-
tween key generation and Franson security check. To
achieve near-unity Franson interferometric visibilities,
nonlocal dispersion cancellation [25] was implemented by
applying a negative differential dispersion (using low dis-
persion LEAF fiber) in Bob’s arm of the interferometer.
The long–short fiber length difference of the Franson in-
terferometer in Fig. 1(b) was fixed at τ = 794 ps.
The InGaAs single-photon avalanche diodes (SPADs)
were operated in the self-differencing mode at a gating
frequency of 1.26 GHz (794 ps time bin), with detection
efficiencies of 18% at 1560 nm and an effective detection
gate width of ≈100 ps [31, 33]. The SPADs were op-
erated at 5◦ C to minimize afterpulsing [34]. The dark
count rates were ≈ 8 × 103 counts per second at this
temperature. Detection events were time stamped with
time-to-digital converters (TDCs) whose time base was
phase locked to the SPAD gating signals.
Alice and Bob’s raw timing data were collected from
the TDCs after every 50 s QKD session. For each PPM
frame, Bob’s data were first parsed into log2N bit sym-
bols. We then performed error correction using a custom
code developed by Zhou et al. [35] for high-dimensional
QKD (HDQKD) with blocks of 4000 symbols each, and
outputted the error-corrected symbols. After calculating
the PIE, corrected symbols were fed into the privacy am-
plification algorithm [36] to obtain the final keys. The key
length for each session was 5 × 107 symbols. The finite
key length penalty ∆FK due to error correction (ǫEC),
privacy amplification (ǫPA) and smooth min-entropy es-
timation (ǫ¯) were calculated in the same way as in [3],
with ǫEC = ǫPA = ǫ¯ = 10
−10 for optimal results [29].
One complication in the hybrid scheme arises from Al-
ice’s switching of the photon sources, which truncates her
SPDC’s two-photon joint temporal width to the frame
duration Tf . This causes the first bin to lose Franson vis-
ibility because it would have required quantum interfer-
ence between light from the first bin of the SPDC frame
traveling through the short path (of the Franson inter-
ferometer) and light from the last bin of the previous
PPM frame traveling through the long path. Figure 2(a)
plots the average Franson visibilities measured for dif-
ferent frame sizes. The inset of Fig. 2(a) plots time-bin
resolved Franson visibilities for frame size N = 10, show-
ing near-unity visibilities in all bins except the first one.
The residual visibility in the first bin in Fig. 2(a) is due
to interference that occurs, at low probability, when the
Franson frame is preceded by another Franson frame. In
this work we use the maximum time-bin resolved vis-
ibility as a measure of the two-photon frequency anti-
correlation needed to bound Eve’s Holevo information.
This treatment circumvents the visibility degradation in
the first bin, which does not reflect the intrinsic corre-
lation between the SPDC signal and idler photons. For
QKD operation, we set an ASE photon rate µPPM = 0.5,
and a low µSPDC = 0.005 to maintain near-unity exper-
4imental Franson visibility of V/V th = 99.7 ± 0.1% that
leads to a small χE.
The ASE and SPDC signal light are indistinguishable
to Eve, except for the disparity in their mean photon
numbers. To defeat Eve’s photon-number-splitting at-
tack [37], we implement a passive decoy-state method [38]
by grouping the time bins within an SPDC frame into
subgroups to create an adjustable intensity per sub-
group [5]. In addition to the ASE signal state, we choose
two SPDC decoy states to estimate Q1 and χE1 , in which
we consider ǫdecoy = 10
−6 for the finite data analysis.
Unlike conventional decoy-state operation with active
modulation [23], our decoy-state method generates sig-
nal/decoy intensity levels passively in the post-processing
stage. This removes the requirement of fast QRNGs and
significantly reduces the possibility of signal/decoy in-
formation leakage in the source [40]. The details of our
decoy-state estimation are given in Supplemental Mate-
rial [29].
Figure 2(b) plots the optimized PIE results for differ-
ent frame sizes showing that they increase with increasing
N . The maximum ∆INAB (after considering the finite key
effect) is 4.0 bits per detected photon at N = 128 with
χE = 2.1 bits. The trend of increasing SI at larger N is
expected given the precise timing of the generated PPM
pattern, for which the dominant causes of symbol errors
were afterpulsing of the InGaAs SPADs [34], i.e., an ef-
fect that does not scale up with increasing frame size.
Figure 2(c) plots the final secret-key throughput (after
decoy-state processing) together with the photon recep-
tion rates for different frame sizes. The key throughput
exceeds photon-reception rate for all frames larger than
N = 4, a metric no other QKD protocol but PPM-QKD
has attained. The peak throughput of 8.0 Mbit/s, higher
than the photon detection rate of 6 MHz, is achieved at
N = 8 with a PIE ∆I8AB = 2.3 bits per photon (χ
E = 0.37
bits). This key rate could have been higher but was lim-
ited by the TDC maximum recording speed and Bob’s
sub-optimal basis selection ratio. With optimized ratio
and no counter constraint, we could expect a key rate
of about 20 Mbit/s. We also point out that the demon-
strated PPM-QKD throughput is on par with that of the
entanglement-based HDQKD [16], but with much less re-
liance on highly efficient single-photon detectors.
Next, we investigated QKD rates at increasing chan-
nel loss up to 5 dB using variable attenuation to simu-
late 0.2 dB/km loss due to fiber propagation. Figure 3
compares the results for N = 2, 8, 32 to theoretical cal-
culations that extend to 100 km. The theoretical curves
use the same parameters as those used in the experi-
ment and assume the Franson visibilities degrade over
distance only due to diminished coincidence-to-accidental
ratios. As expected, the measured key rates decrease lin-
early with distance up to 25 km, a suitable range for a
metropolitan quantum link. At 25 km, PPM-QKD pro-
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FIG. 3. (color online). Experimental PPM-QKD throughputs
and theoretical predictions. Measured key rates up to loss
equivalent to 25 km of fiber propagation are plotted for N = 2
(squares), N = 8 (triangles) and N = 32 (circles). Solid lines
are theoretical rates for the same experimental parameters.
Data for other frame sizes show similar agreement with the
theory, and are not plotted here for better clarity. Reported
key rates of other protocols within the range are also plotted.
duces a maximum key rate of 2.5 Mbit/s (N = 8), and
its PIE at 2.3 bits per detection is the same as in short
distances. That PIE does not degrade over distances in-
dicates that Eve’s Holevo information is virtually inde-
pendent of Bob’s channel loss in the tested range because
Franson visibility is highly tolerant to loss and dispersion
[25]. We did not measure key rates beyond 25 km due to
long integration times for Franson measurements; how-
ever, high-fidelity Franson statistics can be established
at longer distances within a reasonable duration by us-
ing high-efficiency detectors [41]. Note that the projected
secret-key rates with N = 8 remain higher than the pho-
ton reception rates up to 100 km, with a value above 100
kbit/s at 100 km.
To further unleash the power of PPM-QKD, we con-
sider plausible future extensions of the protocol. The
Franson interferometer delay ∆T can be made reconfig-
urable and set equal to the frame duration Tf that varies
with N . Referring to our security analysis [29], for a fixed
degradation of Franson visibility, a larger ∆T leads to a
lower excess noise of the frequency correlation Eve could
exploit. This modification thus allows a tighter bound
on χE for large frames, therefore boosting the PIE key
capacity even beyond the present experiment. With the
same experimental parameters used in Fig. 2, except that
∆T = Tf , we obtain a PIE of 8.8 bits for N = 1024, and
a resultant key throughput about 5 times higher than
the photon reception rate. In applications in which the
transmitter’s photon flux is constrained, such as satellite-
based sources with a limited power consumption budget,
the gain in PIE offered by PPM-QKD directly translates
to an enhancement of the key throughput at the receiver.
5To conclude, we have proposed and implemented
PPM-QKD that is secure against collective Gaussian at-
tacks via PPM encoding of a classical light source and
highly-accurate Franson interferometry using an auxil-
iary time-energy entangled source. Our proof-of-principle
system demonstrates photon-efficient key distribution
using practical InGaAs SPADs, achieving 2.5 Mbit/s
throughput at loss equivalent to 25 km of fiber that is un-
ambiguously higher than the photon reception rate. We
note that our unoptimized PPM-QKD demonstration al-
ready delivered secret-key rates comparable to the high-
est of decoy-state BB84 [4] with much fewer transmitted
photons, and we expect the trend to persist at longer
distances because of the same scaling of key rates with
channel loss. Unlike decoy-state BB84, PPM-QKD im-
plements the decoy state protocol passively, hence it may
be less prone to information leakage. Our PPM scheme
may thrive in quantum communication applications that
operate in the photon-starved reception regime, such
as satellite-based quantum crypto-links with constrained
photon-flux transmitters [10, 11] or a quantum local
(metropolitan) access network in which end user-nodes
use inexpensive detectors with limited detection efficien-
cies and count rates.
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6SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL FOR PHOTON-EFFICIENT QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY WITH
PULSE-POSITION MODULATION
ESTIMATING EVE’S HOLEVO INFORMATION FROM FRANSON VISIBILITY
With no access to Alice’s idler beam, Eve’s interaction can only disturb the frequency variance 〈ωˆ2B〉 of the signal
light that Bob receives and the frequency covariance 〈ωˆAωˆB〉 between the conjugate signal and idler measurements.
The total change in the mean-squared frequency difference 〈(ωˆA − ωˆB)2〉 due to Eve’s intrusion is thus bounded by
∆〈ωˆ2B − 2ωˆAωˆB〉 ≤ 2(V th − V )/∆T 2, (3)
where V th is the theoretical Franson visibility for an unperturbed entangled pair assuming a perfect measurement
apparatus. Following the proofs for Gaussian CV-QKD protocols based on the optimality of Eve’s collective Gaussian
attacks for a given time-frequency covariance matrix (TFCM) Γ [1], Eq. (3) constrains the set, M, of physically
allowed TFCMs with corresponding frequency variance and covariance elements. An upper bound on Eve’s Holevo
information for infinite key length is then calculated by maximizing χΓ = S(ρˆE)− S(ρˆE|tA) = S(ρˆAB)− S(ρˆB|tA) over
all TFCMs in M, i.e.,
χEinf = sup
Γ∈M
{χΓ}, (4)
where ρˆE|tA denotes the Eve’s quantum state conditioned on Alice’s arrival-time measurement, and we assume Alice,
Bob and Eve share a pure joint-Gaussian state.
The following gives detailed steps to calculate χEinf, which can also be found in [2]. The undisturbed state of one
signal-idler photon pair generated from cw SPDC takes the form
|φ〉 =
∫∫
dtAdtBe
− (tA+tB)2
16σ2
coh e
− (tA−tB)2
4σ2cor e−iωp
(tA+tB)
2 |tA〉A|tB〉B, (5)
where σcoh is the pump coherence time, and σcor is the biphoton correlation time. The two photons are correlated
in the time domain, and anti-correlated in the frequency domain where time and frequency form a pair of conjugate
bases. We thus introduce the arrival-time operator tˆm and the frequency operator ωˆn, where m,n ∈ {A,B}. The
state |ω〉A(|ω〉B) in this paper represents a single photon of the signal (idler) at frequency ωp/2 + ω (ωp/2 − ω), so
that with this convention the detunings, ω, from ωp/2 are correlated, rather than anti-correlated. The TFCM for the
above state is then
Γ0 =
[
γ0AA γ
0
AB
γ0BA γ
0
BB
]
, (6)
where
γ0AA = γ
0
BB =
[
1
4
σ2cor + σ
2
coh 0
0 1
4σ2cor
+ 1
16σ2coh
]
γ0AB = γ
0
BA =
[
− 1
4
σ2cor + σ
2
coh 0
0 1
4σ2cor
− 1
16σ2coh
]
. (7)
Eve’s presence disturbs Alice and Bob’s initial TFCM to become
γAA = γ
0
AA
γAB = γBA =
[
1− ηt 0
0 1− ηω
]
γ0AB
γBB =
[
1 + ǫt 0
0 1 + ǫω
]
γ0BB, (8)
where {ηt, ηω} denotes the loss in time and frequency correlation, and {ǫt, ǫω} denotes the excess noise in Bob’s
photon. The measured Franson visibility restricts the possible ηω, ǫω values via inequality (1) in the main text. We
note that any disturbance in the biphoton time correlation or Bob’s arrival time variance (reflected by ηt and ǫt)
cannot be bounded by our Franson interference measurement. Nevertheless, such disturbance by Eve does not afford
her any benefit in gaining symbol information encoded in the time basis, thus it has negligible impact on χEinf. To
ensure stronger security, we therefore take the mean-squared time of arrival difference 〈(tˆA − tˆB)2〉 to be the square
of the detector timing jitter (beyond which Eve’s intrusion would have been readily detected by Alice and Bob), and
〈tˆ2B〉 to be the time variance integrated over the entire frame duration.
For a given TFCM, a Gaussian attack maximizes Eve’s Holevo information by assuming that she purifies the state
to a joint Gaussian state between Alice, Bob, and Eve. The Holevo information χΓ for covariance matrix Γ is
χΓ = S(ρˆE)−
∫
dt p(tA)S(ρˆE|tA), (9)
7where S(ρˆ) = −Tr[ρˆ log2(ρˆ)] is the von Neumann entropy of the quantum state ρˆ. Under the assumption that Alice,
Bob and Eve’s joint quantum state is pure, we have S(ρˆE) = S(ρˆAB) and S(ρˆE|tA) = S(ρˆB|tA). Furthermore, because
all states are Gaussian, the von Neumann entropy of Bob and Eve’s conditional quantum state is independent of
Alice’s measurement result. Thus the integral in Eq. (9) can be reduced to
χΓ = S(ρˆAB)− S(ρˆB|tA). (10)
To evaluate χEinf from Eq. (10), we follow the standard formalism by defining
I1 = 〈∆tˆ2A〉〈∆tˆ2B〉
I2 = 〈∆ωˆ2A〉〈∆ωˆ2B〉
I3 = 〈∆tˆA∆tˆB〉〈∆ωˆA∆ωˆB〉
I4 = (〈∆tˆ2A〉〈∆tˆ2B〉 − 〈∆tˆA∆tˆB〉2)(〈∆ωˆ2A〉〈∆ωˆ2B〉 − 〈∆ωˆA∆ωˆB〉2)
d± =
1√
2
√
I1 + I2 + 2I3 ±
√
(I1 + I2 + 2I3)2 − 4I4. (11)
Then S(ρˆAB) = f(d+) + f(d−), where
f(d) = (d+ 1/2) log2(d+ 1/2)− (d− 1/2) log2(d− 1/2), (12)
and we have
S(ρˆB|tA) = f(
√
det[γI|tA ]), (13)
where Bob’s conditional covariance matrix is
γI|tA =
[〈∆tˆ2B〉 − 〈∆tˆA∆tˆB〉2/〈∆tˆ2A〉 0
0 〈∆ωˆ2B〉
]
. (14)
Our upper bound on Eve’s Holevo information for infinite key length is then found from
χEinf = sup
Γ∈M
{χΓ}.
CALCULATION OF INFORMATION LOSS DUE TO FINITE KEY LENGTHS
The finite-data analysis against collective attacks follows [3]. For the estimation of χE, Eve’s Holevo information
with finite key consideration, Alice and Bob calculate their normalized frequency correlation from measured Franson
visibilities via Eq. (3), which has a χ2 distribution:
(m− 1) 〈(ωˆA − ωˆB)
2〉
〈(ωˆA0 − ωˆB0)2〉 ∼ χ
2(1− ǫPE ,m− 1), (15)
where m is the number of Franson visibility measurements taken. An upper bound on 〈(ωˆA − ωˆB)2〉 with confidence
interval 1− ǫPE is then given by:
〈(ωˆA − ωˆB)2〉max = 〈(ωˆA0 − ωˆB0)2〉+ 2√
m
erf−1(1 − ǫPE)〈(ωˆA − ωˆB)2〉. (16)
This upper bound is then used to calculate the worst case χE and the most pessimistic secure PIE based on the
procedure in section I. In our experiment, m = 100, and we choose ǫPE = 10
−5. The overall failure probability of the
entire protocol is thus ǫs = ǫEC + ǫPA + ǫ¯+ ǫPE ≈ 10−5.
THEORETICAL MODEL
In this section, we present the model used to obtain the theoretical rates presented in Fig. 3 of the main text. We
use the proposal from [4] to model the system. We use a beam splitter with transmissivity η followed by an ideal
single-photon detector with no photon number resolution capability to model the channel and detection. The system
transmissivity η is given by:
η = ηB10
−αl/10, (17)
where ηB denotes the transmissivity on Bob’s side, including the internal transmission efficiency of optical components
and detector efficiency. The channel loss is included for a transmission distance l km with a loss coefficient α measured
in dB/km. Then, the efficiency ηi of the i-photon state with respect to a detector is given by:
ηi = 1− (1− η)i (18)
for i = 0, 1, 2, · · · .
Yield: Define Yi as the yield of an i-photon state, i.e., the conditional probability of a detection event by Bob,
given that Alice sends an i-photon state. Note that Y0 is the background rate which includes detector dark counts and
8other background contributions. The yield of the i-photon states Yi comes mainly from two parts, the background
and the true signal. Assuming that the background counts are independent of the signal photon detection, then Yi is
given by:
Yi = Y0 + ηi − Y0ηi ∼= Y0 + ηi. (19)
Here, we assume Y0 (typically 10
−5) and η (typically 10−3) are small.
Gain: The gain of i-photon states Qi is given by:
Qi = Yi
µi
i!
e−µ, (20)
where µ is defined as the mean photon number per frame. The gain Qi is the probability that Alice sends out an
i-photon state and Bob obtains a detection in a frame. Then the overall gain, the probability for Bob to obtain a
detection event in a frame, is the sum over all Qi’s:
Qµ =
∞∑
i=0
Yi
µi
i!
e−µ. (21)
In the QKD scenario that we are considering, Eve’s attack can change the Yi. Without Eve, in normal QKD,
Eqs. (18)–(20) are satisfied for all i = 0, 1, 2, · · · . Thus, the gain is given by:
Qµ = Y0 + 1− e−ηµ. (22)
Due to the fact that Qµ can be measured or tested experimentally, we will use Eq. (22) in our theoretical model.
Now, let Alice’s optical switch have a probability Pos in choosing the ASE source. If the frame length is Tf , then
the expected count rate for the ASE source in the timing measurement is given by
Nc =
1
Tf
PosQµ,
where we assume that there is no limitation on the count rates of the TDC.
DECOY-STATE ANALYSIS
We show how to use the decoy-state method to obtain the lower bound on the single-photon gain Q1 and the upper
bound on the single-photon mean-squared frequency difference 〈(ωˆA − ωˆB)2〉1. To generate different intensity levels
of decoy states, we group the time bins within an SPDC frame into subgroups [5]. That is, Bob partitions an SPDC
frame into two subgroups containing Fν1 (Fν2) bins in the first (second) subgroup, with a corresponding mean photon
number per subgroup ν1 (ν2). For instance, for an SPDC frame with N time bins, we define the initial mean photon
number per frame as ν = Nνbin, where νbin is the mean photon number per bin. We can choose Fν1 = N/2 and
Fν2 = N/4, then we have two decoy states with ν1 = ν/2 and ν2 = ν/4. The signal state µ is the mean photon number
per frame, generated from the ASE source. Once the gains of signal/decoy states are experimentally determined, we
can follow [6] for decoy-state estimation where we assume that Alice and Bob choose ν1 and ν2 satisfying
0 ≤ ν2 < ν1
ν1 + ν2 < µ.
(23)
Single-photon yield
The gains of the two decoy states are given by
Qν1 =
∞∑
i=0
Yi
νi1
i!
e−ν1 , (24)
Qν2 =
∞∑
i=0
Yi
νi2
i!
e−ν2 . (25)
First Alice and Bob can estimate the lower bound on the background rate Y0 from
ν1Qν2e
ν2 − ν2Qν1eν1 = (ν1 − ν2)Y0 − ν1ν2
∞∑
i=1
Yi+1
νi1 − νi2
(i+ 1)!
≤ (ν1 − ν2)Y0.
Thus, a lower bound of Y0 is given by
Y0 ≥ Y0 = max{ν1Qν2e
ν2 − ν2Qν1eν1
ν1 − ν2 , 0}. (26)
9Now, from Eq. (21), the contribution from multi-photon states (with photon number ≥ 2) in the signal state can
be expressed as,
∞∑
i=2
Yi
µi
i!
= Qµe
µ − Y0 − Y1µ. (27)
Combining Eqs. (24) and (25), under condition Eq. (23), we have [7]
Qν1e
ν1 −Qν2eν2 = Y1(ν1 − ν2) +
∞∑
i=2
Yi
i!
(νi1 − νi2) ≤ Y1(ν1 − ν2) +
ν21 − ν22
µ2
∞∑
i=2
Yi
µi
i!
= Y1(ν1 − ν2) + ν
2
1 − ν22
µ2
(Qµe
µ − Y0 − Y1µ) ≤ Y1(ν1 − ν2) + ν
2
1 − ν22
µ2
(Qµe
µ − Y0 − Y1µ),
(28)
where Y0 is defined in Eq. (26). By solving inequality (28), the lower bound of Y1 is given by
Y1 ≥ Y1 = µ
µν1 − µν2 − ν21 + ν22
[
Qν1e
ν1 −Qν2eν2 −
ν21 − ν22
µ2
(Qµe
µ − Y0)
]
. (29)
Single-photon frequency correlation
As mentioned in Sec. , the mean-squared frequency difference 〈(ωˆA−ωˆB)2〉 can be bounded by the Franson visibility.
We have that 〈(ωˆA − ωˆB)2〉 can be written as
〈(ωˆA − ωˆB)2〉 = Q1
Qν
〈(ωˆA − ωˆB)2〉1 + (1 − Q1
Qν
)〈(ωˆA − ωˆB)2〉m, (30)
where 〈(ωˆA − ωˆB)2〉1 is the mean-squared frequency difference due to single-pair emission, and 〈(ωˆA − ωˆB)2〉m is
the mean-squared frequency difference due to multiple pair emissions and dark counts. We can then upper bound
〈(ωˆA − ωˆB)2〉1 as follows:
〈(ωˆA − ωˆB)2〉1 ≤ 〈(ωˆA − ωˆB)2〉1 = Qν〈(ωˆA − ωˆB)
2〉
Y1νe−ν
, (31)
where ν = Nνbin is the mean photon pairs per SPDC frame.
Finite-data effect
In the context of Gaussian attacks in our security analysis, we adopt the standard error analysis [7] to estimate the
finite-key effect in decoy-state operation. The lower bound and upper bound on the gains are given by
Qλ = Qλ(1 +
nα√
NλQλ
), (32)
Qλ = Qλ(1− nα√NλQλ ), (33)
where λ ∈ {µ, ν1, ν2}, nα is the number of standard deviations one chooses for statistical fluctuation analysis, Nλ is the
number of frames sent by Alice. We can insert these bounds into Eqs. (26) and (31) to obtain Y1 and 〈(ωˆA − ωˆB)2〉1
in the finite-data case.
Finally, the gain of single-photon state is, according to Eq. (20),
Q1 ≥ Q1 = µe−µY1. (34)
The upper bound on Eve’s Holevo information, χE1 , can be obtained by using Eq. (4), in which the setM is constrained
by 〈(ωˆA − ωˆB)2〉1 [6].
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